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    Economic Prospects for Brazil over the Next Decade
Introduction
This ‘Brazil in Focus’ Policy Brief follows the publication of 
Development Viewpoints #84 and #85, both of which fo-
cused on the evolution of macroeconomic policies during 
the Workers Party administrations of Luís Inácio Lula da 
Silva and Dilma Rousseff (2003-2014). 
Those Development Viewpoints assessed the record of 
these administrations in implementing progressive mac-
roeconomic policies, particularly in contrast to the tight 
monetary policies advanced by the Brazilian Central Bank.
However, during the start of Dilma Rousseff’s second ad-
ministration in 2015, the economy of Brazil has begun to 
experience a recession, the government is facing a larger 
fiscal deficit, and the deficit on the country’s current ac-
count is widening. Many people are now asking whether 
economic conditions in Brazil will continue to worsen.
In response to these concerns, we employ the CAM 
global macroeconometric model to project Brazil’s likely 
economic trends over the next ten years, between 2015 
and 20251. Given its demand-driven structure and large 
database of historical trends, the CAM has succeeded in 
providing, in past research efforts, credible projections of 
such medium-term trends.
We consider our projection to be a ‘baseline’ scenario, into 
which a minimum of assumptions have been introduced. 
But we do explicitly assume 1) a nominal depreciation in 
the euro as a result of the ECB’s quantitative easing and 2) 
a slow rise of the real price of oil over the medium term 
relative to its fall during 2014-15. Both of these assump-
tions are embedded in our programming.
But, importantly, we do not assume any changes in eco-
nomic policy by Brazil’s government. Thus, its future pros-
pects in this scenario are driven primarily by the momen-
tum of its historical performance and the evolution of 
global external forces.
1 See alpha-fss.com/main/services.html; details on the CAM 
model are available from the authors. 
The result is that while Brazil faces a continued risk of re-
cession over the short term, its economic prospects over 
the medium term look more positive. The baseline sce-
nario projects a return to positive GDP growth by 2017, 
and a return to GDP growth rates consistent with Brazil’s 
historical average by 2020.
Global Context
We start our overall assessment of Brazil’s prospects with 
a review of trends in the global economy. In doing so, we 
focus on four major blocs: the USA, Europe, mainland Chi-
na and the high-income region in East Asia outside main-
land China (which is dominated by Japan and the Repub-
lic of Korea and is labelled “OEH”).
Collectively, these four blocs account for about 70% of 
world GDP. Thus, their medium-term outlooks will be a 
major global determinant of the economic prospects of 
Brazil.
In general, global growth is projected to be subdued over 
the next ten years (Figure 1). It will be lower than the pre-
2000 average for each of the four major blocs considered 
here. Thus, this trend is consistent with the “secular stag-
nation” thesis recently revived by Lawrence Summers2.
2 See, for example, Summers, L.  2015.  “Demand Side Secular 
Stagnation.”  American Economic Review 105.5: 60-65.
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In addition (and in common with a number of other observ-
ers), we do not project a substantial correction of global im-
balances over the medium term.
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Growth rates in Europe, the USA and OEH are projected to 
be moderate—close to their post-2000 averages over the 
medium term. These are slower than the 1980-2000 aver-
ages. In particular, China’s growth is projected to slow to 
about 7% by 2025. 
Figure 2 charts projected gross fixed capital formation as a 
percentage of GDP for the four blocs in our scenario. While 
investment levels are expected to increase moderately in 
the USA, Europe and OEH, these increases would represent 
a subdued response to historically low real interest rates. 
Meanwhile, there would be a pronounced continuing fall 
in Chinese investment (but from a relatively high peak in 
2010).
Figure 3 shows that the current-account surpluses in East 
Asia, specifically in China and Other High-Income East Asia 
(such as Japan) would remain significant. Meanwhile, the 
surplus in Europe (determined largely by Germany) is pro-
jected to progressively decline towards zero by 2025.  How-
ever, the large and persistent current-account deficits of the 
United States are expected to progressively worsen over the 
next ten years, reaching 5.4% of GDP by 2025. This trend is 
indeed troubling, though it is reinforced, in effect, by con-
tinuing current-account surpluses in East Asia.
Outlook for Brazil
Having sketched out very briefly some of the projected ma-
jor trends in the global economy through 2025, we now turn 
to an examination of Brazil’s prospects within this context.
The risk of a recession in Brazil in the short term is high. 
The CAM model projects a contraction of -1% for 2015 as 
a whole , and a continuation of recession in 2016. But the 
model projects an escape from recession by 2017 (see 
Figure 4).
Over the medium term, Brazil’s prospects are brighter. The 
CAM projects Brazil’s GDP growth to progressively rise to 
2.6% through 2025. Though the escape from recession is a 
positive development, future growth rates are still expected 
to remain moderate by historical standards. 
One of the major drivers of future Brazilian growth is expect-
ed to be an improvement in the country’s current account 
(see Figure 5 next page). Brazil’s current-account improve-
ment is explained mainly by an increase in the country’s 
trade surplus in primary commodities, and a rapid improve-
ment towards a surplus in fuels.
At the same time, its trade deficits in manufactures and ser-
vices are expected to narrow slightly, and its deficit on in-
come and transfers is also projected to improve modestly.  
These trade-balance improvements are aided by a projected 
decline in Brazil’s real exchange rate of about 10% through 
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Figure 4: Brazilian GDP Growth (%)
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Unfortunately, Brazil’s investment as a ratio to GDP is pro-
jected to remain at a historically low level of about 15%. This 
is one of the explanations for the expected moderation in 
growth rates of the economy over the next ten years.
It is noteworthy that while Brazil is projected to improve its 
current-account balance, its net external asset position will 
still continue to deteriorate, reaching -51% of GDP by 2021, 
before it begins to improve marginally thereafter (Figure 6). 
A country’s net external asset position results from adding 
its financial assets held abroad and subtracting foreigners’ 
financial assets held in the country. 
Brazil’s projected worsening net external asset position will 
leave it markedly vulnerable to any future international 
financial turbulence (and the expected rapid outflow of 
short-term investment from the country).  
By comparison, a number of other major emerging econ-
omies, such as the People’s Republic of China, Russia and 
most countries in East Asia, are expected to continue run-
ning positive net external asset positions. Even India’s posi-
tion is expected to be closer to -15% of GDP over the pro-
jected period. 
The financing position of the Brazilian government is also 
projected to remain vulnerable. Although its public-sector 
lending as a ratio to GDP would improve over the next ten 
years, it would still remain worse than -6% (see Figure 7). 
Moreover, its debt-to-GDP level would be expected to rise 
progressively to over 76% by 2025—namely, to a worrying 
pinnacle last observed in 2002 (Figure 8).
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Brazil is expected to start growing moderately by 2017 and 
its current-account deficit is projected to progressively di-
minish and turn into a small surplus by 2023.
Yet Brazil’s net external asset position will continue to wors-
en over most of the next ten years. While the government’s 
net lending will likely improve marginally, its debt as a ratio 
to GDP will continue to progressively rise throughout this 
period.
In closing, it should be noted again that these results for 
Brazil as well as for the global economy are based on a 
‘baseline’ scenario that assumes no important changes in 
economic policies either at the global level or in Brazil. 
Addressing the need for such policy changes and testing 
their usefulness through designing further CAM projections 
will be the priority of our on-going research.
Concluding Remarks
In this Policy Brief we have used the CAM global macro mod-
el to construct a ‘baseline’ scenario for the global economy 
in general and for Brazil in particular over the next 10 years.
The expected global context for this period is one of sub-
dued growth. This projection is consistent with the recently 
revived “secular stagnation” thesis. At the same time, global 
imbalances are expected to persist. 
This trend would apply especially to the USA, which is likely 
to run a progressively larger current-account deficit, with a 
net external asset position approaching a negative 55% of 
GDP by 2025. 
Such an ominous deterioration in the external position of 
the world’s dominant reserve-currency country is not likely 
to be a globally sustainable trend. Such stark and growing 
imbalances will surely generate, sooner if not later, a return 
to international financial turbulence.
The results of our CAM modelling do paint a more optimistic 
medium-term picture of the Brazilian economy than would 
likely be imagined on the basis of assessing its current bleak 
economic conjuncture. 
